It is very possible that Richard Nixon, despite the Post stories and the FBI discoveries, would never have been impeached, nor his entire administration ruined and half of them imprisoned, had it not been for the letter.
The letter, penned by James McCord and addressed to Watergate trial judge John Sirica, said that “pressure” had been applied to silence the defendants and that perjury had been committed during the trial. As you might imagine, this really pissed off Sirica.
Nixon, sworn-in for a second term following his landslide re-election, had probably felt secure. Payoff money had kept Howard Hunt quiet, and the plane crash which fortuitously killed Hunt’s wife on December 8th of 1972 seemed to have ended further blackmail demands. And although it had been revealed that the sequentially-numbered bills in the burglars’ pockets had begun life in the finance arm of the Committee to Re-Elect, and although the FBI had concluded – and Woodward and Bernstein, in the Post, had reported – that Mitchell, while Attorney General, had controlled a secret fund used for spying and sabotage against the Democrats, nobody much cared what The Post was printing and, for reasons which will appear, Nixon felt confident that he could dodge the FBI.
McCord’s letter, however, was alarming. It galvanized the Senate, which created the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, and the Committee’s investigators started poking around. And although in the early stages of the Senate inquiry virtually no one expected it to lead inside the Oval Office, Nixon decided that he might have to toss someone overboard.
The designated goat would be White House Counsel John Dean, who could be linked both to Hunt and his ‘Plumbers’ and to the payment of money to Donald Segretti, the low-level point-man for general campaign dirty tricks.
Hugh Sloan, deputy to Finance Director Maurice Stans, told the FBI about the wads of cash going to Hunt and many others, hundreds of thousands of dollars pulled from the safe by very senior Nixon aides. Even when John Dean, White House Counsel, decided to start blabbing to the Senate Committee’s investigators, it was believed that he could be discredited. Neither Congress nor the public knew what Hugh Sloan had told the FBI. And although Dean’s testimony would be an embarrassment, he couldn’t prove any of it.
Inside the Oval Office, the hidden microphones continued to feed the wiring which ran, elsewhere, to reels of tape. What Dean was saying to the Committee’s lawyers could be substantiated if anyone got hold of them. But Dean didn’t know about the taping system. And Nixon did not order the tapes destroyed or the system removed.
The Senate Committee began televised hearings on May 18th. Two weeks later, John Dean testified that he had discussed Watergate with the President more than thirty-five times. But other administration officials contradicted him, and denied any knowledge of or participation in either the burglary or cover-up, and a popular majority continued to support Nixon.
One guy who did know about the taping system inside the Oval Office was White House Aide Alexander Butterfield. Unlike the FBI, Butterfield did not keep this information strictly to himself.
As it was later described, Butterfield responded to one of the first, almost random questions by asking why the Committee didn’t simply listen to the tapes. Gosh, he then said, I hope I didn’t make a mistake in telling you this.
One can easily imagine Nixon smashing the White House furniture. Still, he did not destroy the tapes. He did not do so even after his special prosecutor, Archibald Cox, as well as the Senate Committee, went after them. He would refuse to turn them over, he said, and fired Cox. In what seemed at the time an odd turn of events, he also found time to stage-manage the public disgrace of his own hand-picked Vice President, Spiro Agnew.
Since the U.S. Congress in the 1970s was anything but the compliant bunch of fools it would become over the next forty years, the President’s refusal to turn over the tapes did not stop the investigations; it accelerated them. And the Supreme Court at that time, even with Nixon’s own appointees, was not the ideological, partisan bunch we’ve got today.
With Butterfield’s slip-of-the-tongue, and knowing he had little chance to evade its consequences, Nixon continued to fight. The tapes were protected, he said, by executive privilege. He might consider releasing transcripts, redacted where necessary to protect national security, but not the tapes themselves.
Congress was not appeased. It forced the appointment of a new Special Prosecutor and extracted a pledge that this one could not be fired without congressional approval. And it took one look at the limited transcripts Nixon turned over and declared itself unamused.
One by one, Nixon’s big guns perjured themselves. their memories failed them, but the testimony they did give was perjury anyhow. Mitchell, Maurice Stans, Kalmbach, Jeb Magruder, John Mitchell, Ehrlichman and Haldeman, all of them lied to the best of their abilities but it would not be enough. Nothing would save Nixon now.
Okay, you may be thinking: that’s four posts on Watergate and apart from a few interesting little details, it sounds a lot like what we already know. Yup. But not any longer.
Look for the next installment, “Watergate, part 5: What’s a Little Blackmail Among Friends?” coming soon.

