In part two, we take a look at the elements which the Illinois House considered to be applicable in evaluating impeachable offenses, and on which the Senate voted unanimously to remove Rod Blagojevich from office –– and bar him from holding office in the state ever again.
Before we get to these, however, it is useful to look at what they considered to be the burden of proof, which turned out to be that they had no such burden. Nothing at all needed to be proved. It was, they said, simple a matter of personal judgment.
The Committee cited dicta from court decisions in Texas and Connecticut and a couple of other states to the effect that no standards existed and that, therefore, they needed none. The Committee did not rely on court precedent from its own state, however.
This omission is explicable when you see what the Illinois precedent was. In 1997, the legislature explored the legal standard for impeachment of a state Supreme Court justice named Heiple. They concluded that an impeachment required “clear and convincing evidence.”
But this legislature said that although it was relevant to use the words of various bodies from other states in other cases and in other circumstances as removing all limits on the discretion of members to vote for impeachment, Illinois precedent did not matter because “a member’s individual determination is not controlled by another member’s decision 11 years ago.”
Lawyers among this webLog’s subscribers will enjoy the spectacular dance routine this required. Try telling the California Supreme Court, for example, that it should apply not California precedent but that of, say Rhode Island. I can hear the horse laugh from here to Vermont.
Having set the table, the legislature began to chow down. In its bill of particulars, two types of offenses were described. The first category were those items charged in the U.S. Attorney’s criminal complaint. The second were matters which were not charged and, therefore, presumptively either not criminal by definition or beyond what Fitzgerald thinks he can prove.
The Illinois pols had no choice but to deny the “clear and convincing evidence” demanded by state precedent because if that was the standard Blagojevich could not be impeached and convicted.
That is so because they did not know, and could not know, whether such evidence existed. Fitzgerald, by agreement with the legislature, prohibited examination of testimony and exhibits which he himself declared excluded, and he excluded everybody and everything with the exception of a few recorded excerpts from the wiretaps, and an affidavit signed by Special Agent Daniel W. Cain in support of the arrest warrant.
It meant that the ‘category one’ offenses, which are two –– the alleged attempt to ‘sell’ Obama’s Senate seat to the highest bidder, and the alleged attempt to condition state financial aid to the Tribune Company on the firing of members of its editorial board, could not actually be proven because Fitzgerald was reserving all of the evidence, including the testimony of people who might actually have some knowledge of these allegations, to himself. The legislature was left with nothing but hearsay, which they tried to stretch as much as possible.
The wiretap excerpts cited by the legislature are instructive. What they seem to show is a governor talking about what he might be able to get in exchange for the Senate appointment. Blagojevich is quoted as saying that “if... they’re not going to offer anything of any value, then I might just take it.” In reference to the candidate believed to be Obama’s own choice: “...unless I get something real good... shit, I’ll just send myself, you know what I’m saying,” and “I’m going to keep this Senate option for me a real possibility, you know, and therefore I can drive a hard bargain...” and “(it’s) a fucking valuable thing, you don’t just give it away for nothing.”
I don’t know about you, but I am shocked! Shocked that there is gambling going on at Rick’s Place in Casablanca.
Perhaps the Illinois legislators have never been east of Chicago, but the rest of us know that a large financial contribution is the traditional method of securing an Ambassadorship, that tax bills are written in committees by lobbyists for wealthy corporations who paid for the campaigns of the committee members, and that the last time an American governor made an appointment to fill a vacant Senate seat where there was no consideration of just exactly what benefits such an appointment would bring in return was... well, never.
This is the pot calling the kettle Negro.
Worth noting, the legislature dismissed ameliorative excerpts such as: “(I’ll make the appointment) in good faith... but it’s not coming for free... it’s got to be good for the people of Illinois and good for me.”
Since the actual recordings are not available –– although Blagojevich has repeatedly called for their complete release –– we, and Illinois, were left with snippets, but those snippets contain clues to something a little less sinister than is widely reported. That is that the Governor, while looking for a way to gain either politically or personally, was mostly just jabbering.
This is clear because the excerpts are anything but. They’ve got Blagojevich muttering about (Senate candidate #1), believed to be Obama’s preference, that if he didn’t get anything for it, well, by God, he’d give the damned thing to... well, candidate #4 (Aff., 101(c)), or candidate #5 (Aff.,102), or candidate #6 (Aff., 105).
In other words, sorry Governor, but it’s hot air. Blagojevich wanted the same kind of political leverage he saw others exercise elsewhere and, damn it, he wasn’t getting it. Central to this frustration was Obama, who wouldn’t give him anything. Again and again, Blagojevich is quoted as saying about Obama, “...if they feel like they can do this and not fucking give me anything... then I’ll fucking go to (candidate 5),” and “they’re not willing to give me anything except appreciation. Fuck them,” and so forth.
Garden variety scummy, wouldn’t you agree? It’s how a lot of politicians think and how a lot of them talk. It’s not rare. And, apart from the clumsiness of his methods, there’s nothing here which distinguishes Blagojevich from, let’s say, plenty of other governors you could name.
Politics. I don’t care how clean you are, or at least how clean you were when you got started, if you want to get to the governor’s chair, or nab a Senate seat, or something, you are going to become capable of making deals. If you do not make any deals, you will certainly lose. And because you have convinced yourself that you possess uncommon abilities, it becomes okay to cut those deals because otherwise the nation will be deprived of your leadership.
Why do you think the Democratic Party in Congress, whether in the majority or not, sells out working people, poor people, and those most in need? Because, with few exceptions, those folks are not what gets you re-elected.
Look, I’ve known Barbara Boxer for more than thirty years. I think she’s one of the best in the Senate. But I am quite certain that she has more than once voted against her own conscience for reasons of expediency, and I know that she takes some positions purely for the purpose of feeding her campaign coffers. That doesn’t make her a bad Senator or a bad person. It makes her a very successful Senator in a tough environment.
Or, as John Lennon said, “There’s room at the top, they are telling you still, but first you must learn to smile as you kill, if you want to be like the folks on the hill...”
What Blagojevich did, based on the actual record that the Illinois legislature had before it, is hardly distinguishable from what is no doubt common conduct, albeit at a lower level, among the same men and women who voted to impeach and convict him.
Let’s take a look now at the second charge, the other one contained in the Fitzgerald prosecution and to which, by his prohibition, no evidence or testimony could be meaningfully examined or challenged. It is that the Governor threatened to withhold from the Tribune Company about a hundred million bucks unless the newspaper bearing its name got rid of some editorial board members who’d been critical of him (and had been calling for his impeachment long before his arrest).
The Tribune story is a curious one. The legislature’s version, as the Committee wrote it, begins this way:
“Recently, the Tribune Company has been contemplating the sale of the Chicago Cubs baseball team and Wrigley Field to pay debt associated with the recent purchase of the Tribune Company by a new owner. In connection with these efforts, the Tribune Company had explored the possibility of obtaining financial assistance from the State of Illinois through the Illinois Finance Authority (IFA), assistance which was estimated to be worth $100-$150 million.”
The allegations against Blagojevich, with respect to the Tribune situation, are that he told the Tribune that he would not approve IFA funds unless it got rid of several members of its editorial board.
Background: the editorial board had been arguing for his impeachment long before the Fitzgerald story broke, and its position was based on what it claimed was Blagojevich’s “going around the legislature” on state matters.
More background: Blagojevich had attended a meeting with the prospective new owner of the Cubs who spoke of the financial need of tearing down Wrigley Field and building a new “Coors Field” type of stadium. This horrified Blagojevich, as it does me. If you’re tearing down Wrigley Field, you are close to tearing down the Washington Monument or the Golden Gate Bridge. The Governor decided to do something about it.
The Illinois legislature refused to advance any funds to secure Wrigley Field, but the Governor saw an alternative channel. He pushed the use of IFA funds.
The irony of this was not lost on Blagojevich, who noted that in order to help the Tribune while preserving Wrigley he would have to “go around” the legislature, exactly the behavior which the Tribune had cited in urging his impeachment. There ensued several conversations between the Governor and his aides in which he said, basically, how can they expect us to do this when they’ll use it against us? It is clear that he further communicated with the Tribune that he expected some editorial support down the road.
With that as the background, it is hardly surprising that Blagojevich, in what I concede was not his best moment, said that the Tribune ought to be told, “Maybe we can’t do this now. Fire those fuckers.”
As we know, the fuckers were not fired.
It is a bit unusual, I suppose, for a governor to threaten the media; usually, it’s the other way around.
There’s more, of course. In installment three we get to the fun stuff and run across a few clues in aid of our main question, which is: why THIS guy?